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This paper analyzes alternative models for emerging sovereign ratings. Although 
a small number of economic fundamentals explain ratings reasonably well,   
variations in those economic fundamentals are themselves explained by a small 
number of world factors. On the other hand, global financial variables associated 
with risk aversion are additionally required in order to explain the significant 
spread compression at the end of 2006. To determine whether ratings matter for 
spreads, the paper compares results across different methodologies, in particular 
exploiting differences in opinion between rating agencies. The evidence from this 
and previous methodologies is that ratings do matter. Finally, the paper finds that 
global indicators of risk aversion have become less important for emerging 
market spreads and that the effect of sub-prime news is less than the effect of 
“average news” on emerging economy credit default swap (CDS) spreads. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In December 2006, emerging country sovereign spreads were close to record lows of around 170 
basis points. The ratings of the two agencies considered in this paper indicate marked 
improvements in the credit quality of emerging sovereigns from the depths of the post-Russia 
crisis of 1998-1999. Interestingly, while spreads rose from April 2007—and especially in July 
2007—ratings from the agencies considered in this paper overall continued to improve in the 




Figure 1. Cumulative Ratings Changes and Spreads: Emerging Countries 
 
                                                 
2 The cumulative upgrade series starts arbitrarily at zero in Jan 2000 and then a +1 is given to each one notch 
upgrade, +2 to each two notch upgrade, a –1 for each one notch downgrade and a –2 to each 2 notch downgrade, etc. 
All upgrades and downgrades are summed for each period and the graph plots the sum over time of that aggregate. 
































































































































































There is a growing literature on modeling ratings. We replicate recent results but we have 
doubts regarding the inclusion of particular variables.  We also discuss the inclusion of different 
measures of debt. Interestingly, a model limited to a more limited number of harder economic 
variables explains a reasonable percentage of the time variation of ratings. This is perhaps not so 
surprising, as we also find that just two global factors explain more than 70 percent of the 
variation in ratings and almost 70 percent of the variation in economic fundamentals and ratings. 
We also analyze movements in spreads for those countries that are in JP Morgan’s EMBI 
global index, a group of systemically important emerging countries. The cost of finance for this 
group is clearly an important question for the public and private sector alike in those countries 
and also for the stability of the international financial system. Our results suggest that 
fundamentals do not explain the whole reduction in spreads to the end of 2006 but that, if we 
include global financial variables, then we can explain much of the decrease in spreads.  In 
general we suggest that without the improvement in the global financial environment, spreads 
would have been some 150 to 170 basis points higher on average for emerging economies at the 
end of 2006. 
We also consider whether ratings matter for spreads. This is not a new question, but when 
defined properly it is not easily answered. In this paper we again replicate methodologies found 
in the literature and obtain similar results to previous authors. However, we also consider an 
innovative method to consider the question; namely, we exploit the differences in opinions 
between rating agencies. The two agencies considered in this paper do not always agree. Indeed 
roughly 50 percent of country-rating observations suggest disagreements. Our results using a 
type of difference-in-difference method suggests that these “opinions” do appear to matter. 
We find that global factors matter less for determining emerging sovereign spreads than 
for earlier in the sample. We also consider recent daily data on 12-month Credit Default Swap 
(CDS) spreads. Since these spreads are available for fewer countries and for a shorter time series 
we prefer to use bond spreads for the work with ratings. However, using this more recent data we 
find a highly significant effect for global financial factors. Interestingly, when we interact the 
indicator of risk in global markets with an event dummy representing news on the sub-prime 
crisis, we find that movements in global risk caused for this motive are less important than 
“average” news.  We consider the implications of this result in the conclusions.       6
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss models of ratings. We 
then turn to models of spreads in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss whether ratings matter. In 
Section 5 we consider whether the effect of world financial factors has diminished and the effect 
of the sub-prime crisis on emerging economy asset prices. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Models of Ratings 
 
There is a small but growing literature on modeling sovereign ratings.  In this section we 
consider traditional models of ratings and then we consider a principal components analysis for 
ratings and for the economic fundamentals that we find drive ratings in the traditional models. 
 
2.1 On Traditional Models of Ratings 
 
Cantor and Packer (1996) is a standard starting point while Afonso et al. (2007) includes an 
excellent review and a comprehensive treatment of alternative models. Moody’s (2004a) on local 
ratings and Moody’s (2004b) on long-term foreign currency ratings are interesting examples of 
work from the rating agencies themselves.   
Models of ratings tend to include variables reflecting a) economic progress (growth, GDP 
per capita, etc.), b) debt and the external sector, including reserves; c) variables that attempt to 
capture political or institutional characteristics (especially Government Effectiveness); and d) 
dummy variables that capture debt payment history. Models with a surprisingly small set of 
variables are quite successful in capturing the cross-sectional variation in ratings and, albeit to a 
lesser extent, ratings’ movements over time.  However, there are several issues that are worthy of 
discussion related to these models.  
Models of ratings have been conducted using panel data. These regressions can be run 
simply with OLS, with random effects or fixed effects or within the context of a dynamic model, 
perhaps employing GMM techniques such as the Arellano-Bond or Blundell-Bond estimators. 
We leave for now the possibility of a dynamic model for ratings as a topic for future research. In 
Afonso et al. (2007), a case is made for random effects and for including the time averages of 
variables in the regression. The idea is that the time averages then capture the cross-sectional 
variations and the time-varying variables capture movements over time; the authors obtain 
appealing results. However, our interest here is to model rating movements to see if movements 
in ratings can account for spread reductions. Moreover, our interpretation of the statistical tests   7
reported, and our own tests below, is that they support the use of a fixed-effects model, although 
in the end the models are similar.
3  
A second issue regarding estimation technique is how to express the dependent variable, 
which is the rating. Ratings are generally expressed according to a non-numerical scale and 
hence an argument can be made that a non-cardinal approach, such as an ordered probit, may be 
most appropriate. Afonso et al. (2007) suggest that an ordinal approach may have some 
advantages. However,  in some cases the estimated distances between rating grades do not reject 
equality—thus implying that converting the ratings to a numerical scale with an equal distance 
between each rating is a fairly good approximation—and the differences in the models taking 
each approach are fairly small. Again, in part as our interest is not ratings per se, we will take the 
approach of using a numerical scale for ratings. When we model spreads we will use both a 
numerical (log) scale and, as an alternative, an approach that does control for differences 
between rating-grades as being unequal.  
 
                                                 
3 We also tested for the presence of time effects.  In our preferred specification the time effects were not significant.   8
Table 1. Explaining Standard and Poor’s Ratings 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP PC (%) 3.519 5.888 7.531 4.997 6.354 5.232
(5.15)*** (3.54)*** (3.84)*** (3.97)*** (4.74)*** (1.87)*
Growth (%) -1.576 -2.580 1.187 -0.387 -0.213 7.323
(0.71) (1.15) (0.48) (0.12) (0.08) (2.96)**
Unemployment (%) 0.007 0.026 0.013 -0.040 -0.018 -0.052
(0.19) (0.66) (0.27) (0.90) (0.43) (0.60)
Inflation (%) -0.612 -0.755 -0.124 -0.083 -0.107 -0.068
(0.53) (0.61) (3.99)*** (4.29)*** (4.41)*** (2.48)**
Gross Central Government Debt Over GDP (%) -0.046 -0.040
(4.01)*** (3.17)***
Fiscal Balance over GDP (%) 4.853 3.885 6.514 6.630 5.421 5.210
(2.27)** (2.00)* (2.36)** (1.85)* (1.63) (1.65)
Government Effectiveness (-2.5 - 2.5) 0.988 0.950
(2.68)*** (2.76)***
Foreign Debt to Exports (%) -0.318 -0.408 -0.634 -0.175 -0.226 0.210
(1.49) (1.52) (1.77)* (0.45) (0.57) (0.28)
Current Account Balance (%) -5.743 -5.209
(2.65)*** (2.41)**
Reserves to GDP (%) 1.986 1.980 -1.592 -2.353 -1.669 -10.468
(1.53) (1.50) (0.60) (0.82) (0.55) (1.68)
Tax Revenue to Total Debt (%) 0.564 0.622 0.584 0.596
(2.54)** (2.60)** (2.46)** (3.19)***
Original Sin 3 (%) -0.809 -0.954
(1.22) (1.26)
Volatility of Real Exchange Rate (%) -0.076 -0.058 -0.030
(2.30)** (1.81)* (1.08)
Foreign Currency Public Debt (% Total) -5.294
(2.47)**
In Default (0,1) -3.498 -3.525 -5.481 -5.877 -5.760 -5.442
(4.87)*** (5.09)*** (14.06)*** (11.28)*** (11.36)*** (7.85)***
Default since 1970 (0,1) -0.765
(1.42)
EU Enter Dummy (0,1) 0.637 0.356 0.969 0.906 0.844
(3.13)*** (1.17) (2.33)** (3.19)*** (2.78)***
EU Step Dummy (0,1) 0.786 0.538 0.947 0.670 0.459
(2.53)** (1.37) (1.89)* (1.65) (1.02)
LAC Dummy (0,1) -0.735
(1.75)*
US Treasury Yield (10 Years, %) 1.292
(2.25)**
US High Yield (10 Years, %) 0.168
(0.40)
VIX Index (%) -0.012
(0.43)
Constant 11.641 6.658 7.096 7.204 3.423 7.669
(11.64)*** (3.16)*** (4.10)*** (3.89)*** (1.44) (2.80)**
Effects Random Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Time Effects No Yes Yes No No No
Observations 356 356 422 368 368 148
Number of group(wbcode) 41 41 41 38 38 14
Rsq-Overall 0.87 0.35 0.20 0.29 0.25 0.06
Rsq-Within 0.71 0.73 0.59 0.53 0.55 0.60
Rsq-Between 0.91 0.40 0.30 0.36 0.34 0.02
Robust z statistics in parentheses
In column 1: variable time-averages, a LAC and an industrialized country dummy are included but not shown
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  9
Table 2. Explaining Moody’s Ratings 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP PC (%) 3.745 8.367 6.222 4.254 5.411 3.003
(4.19)*** (3.57)*** (3.41)*** (2.67)** (2.95)*** (1.03)
Growth (%) -1.320 -2.700 1.890 -1.136 -0.909 7.566
(0.42) (0.87) (0.72) (0.31) (0.26) (2.91)**
Unemployment (%) -0.025 0.028 -0.010 -0.072 -0.055 0.008
(0.46) (0.42) (0.16) (1.44) (1.12) (0.10)
Inflation (%) 0.896 0.007 -0.073 -0.012 -0.016 0.028
(0.91) (0.01) (2.45)** (0.61) (0.65) (0.92)
Gross Central Government Debt Over GDP (%) -0.029 -0.014
(2.22)** (1.07)
Fiscal Balance (%) 0.987 0.840 -0.962 0.358 0.044 1.242
(0.28) (0.27) (0.32) (0.09) (0.01) (0.41)
Government Effectiveness (-2.5 - 2.5) 1.192 0.956
(2.65)*** (2.08)**
Foreign Debt to Exports (%) -0.302 -0.485 -0.718 -0.350 -0.398 -0.454
(0.77) (1.10) (1.57) (0.82) (0.91) (0.45)
Current Account Balance (%) -8.228 -6.890
(2.85)*** (2.47)**
Reserves to GDP (%) 2.539 3.564 1.842 -0.671 -0.020 -5.481
(1.25) (1.76)* (0.74) (0.24) (0.01) (1.04)
Tax Revenue to Total Debt (%) 0.540 0.636 0.599 0.744
(2.36)** (2.77)*** (2.69)** (6.99)***
Original Sin 3 (%) -0.396 -0.417
(0.60) (0.58)
Volatility of Real Exchange Rate (%) -0.089 -0.075 -0.021
(3.26)*** (2.87)*** (0.95)
Foreign Currency Public Debt (% Total) -6.769
(3.44)***
In Default (0,1) -0.544 -0.580 -1.662 -2.101 -1.988 -2.492
(0.70) (0.77) (3.26)*** (2.88)*** (2.96)*** (1.83)*
Default since 1970 (0,1) -1.423
(1.87)*
EU Enter Dummy (0,1) 2.159 1.666 2.113 2.267 2.210
(7.75)*** (5.36)*** (7.30)*** (7.13)*** (6.00)***
EU Step Dummy (0,1) 1.558 1.380 1.991 1.468 1.374
(4.10)*** (2.82)*** (4.79)*** (3.77)*** (2.97)***
LAC Dummy (0,1) -1.388
(2.26)**
US Treasury Yield (10 Years, %) 1.219
(1.68)
US High Yield (10 Years, %) -0.304
(0.55)
VIX Index (%) 0.010
(0.38)
Constant 10.728 2.532 7.836 7.737 4.921 9.650
(8.32)*** (0.87) (4.71)*** (3.63)*** (1.78)* (2.71)**
Effects Random Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
T i m e  E f f e c t s N o Y e s Y e s N oN oN o
Observations 353 353 424 367 367 140
Number of group(wbcode) 43 43 43 40 40 14
Rsq-Overall 0.78 0.28 0.19 0.30 0.27 0.14
Rsq-Within 0.49 0.56 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.54
Rsq-Between 0.85 0.35 0.34 0.41 0.38 0.13
Robust z statistics in parentheses
In column 1: variable time-averages, a LAC and an industrialized country dummy are included but not shown
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  10
The first column of both Table 1 (for Standard and Poor’s) and Table 2 (for Moody’s) 
below replicate the preferred model of Afonso et al. (2007), but for developing countries only—
our interest in this paper.  This model is estimated with random effects and includes not only the 
variables listed but also the means of each variable (not shown).
4 The variables that are 
significant include GDP per capita, Gross Government Debt divided by GDP, Fiscal Balance, 
Government Effectiveness and the Current Account deficit. We also include an EU-entry dummy 
(1 if a country enters the EU for the year of its entry) and an EU membership step-dummy (1 for 
each observation the country is a member of the EU).  The dummy variable for in-default takes a 
value of 1 if the country is in default according to that rating agency and zero otherwise. As can 
be seen, the fit of the model is excellent, with an R-Squared of 0.87 overall for the case of 
Standard and Poor’s ratings and 0.78 for Moody’s ratings.
5  
However, this specification includes a number of variables that merit discussion. First, 
note that the current account deficit has the “wrong sign.” When the current account is more 
positive, the rating is worse rather than better. This is a general result in models that include this 
variable and is not limited to this specification. It seems likely that this is not a good explanation 
of the rating but rather reflects a reverse causality whereby countries with better ratings can 
afford to larger current account deficits, the United States being a good example. 
A second aspect is the role played by Government Effectiveness. As can be seen in the 
tables above, this variable is highly significant. However, it might be described as a summary of 
surveys, the majority of which are perceptions of aspects of government behavior.
6 There is 
therefore a potential concern that the opinion of the rating agency is derived from another 
opinion or set of opinions and it is difficult to believe that the latter is totally independent from 
the former. Moreover, Government Effectiveness is just one indicator that might be included. 
Table 3 below shows a selection of such potential indicators and illustrates that they are all 
highly correlated and each is highly correlated with the ratings of Moody’s and Standard and 
Poor’s. 
 
                                                 
4 As discussed, the authors suggest this is a way of incorporating long-term effects (the variable means) and also 
dynamics (the actual variable), controlling for unobservable variables with the random effects. 
5 These values are slightly lower than those reported in Afonso et al. (2007), but our sample is only developing 
countries. 
6 See Kaufman et al. (2006) for a description of the methodology.   11
A third comment is regarding statistics on debt. Debt is measured in different ways and, 
depending on theoretical considerations, one definition may be more relevant than others.
7 Debt 
may be defined according to a variety of criteria: the issuer (central government, or a wider 
definition of the public sector, or the private sector); gross or net of certain assets held; and  
foreign or domestic according to three different definitions (a) currency of denomination, b) 
residence, or c) where the debt was issued (i.e., legislation). Finally debt may be normalized by 
different variables. Popular choices are GDP and tax revenues and, for foreign debt, exports or 
other elements of the balance of payments. 
  These different dimensions allow a wide variety of debt variables to be chosen. In our 
view, a logical choice is to specify three debt variables as follows: a) the ratio of Tax Revenues 
to total Government (Sovereign) Debt as a measure of the Government’s ability to tax relative to 
its liabilities; b) Total (Private plus Public) External Debt to Exports as a measure of a country’s 
need to obtain resources from the rest of the world to pay creditors from the rest of the world; 
and c) a ratio of debt in foreign currency to total debt as a measure of the riskiness of debt 
composition. However, we realize that this is certainly not a unique choice. 
 
                                                 
7 It is assumed here that the model is to explain the rating on long-term foreign currency debt issued in a foreign 
jurisdiction.  






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Voice and Accountability 1 1.00
Control of Corruption 2 0.82 1.00
Government Effectiveness 3 0.80 0.97 1.00
Political Stability 4 0.81 0.89 0.88 1.00
Rule of Law 5 0.84 0.98 0.98 0.91 1.00
Regulatory Quality 6 0.82 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.93 1.00
Growth Competitive Index Ranking (t) 7 -0.74 -0.92 -0.95 -0.81 -0.93 -0.86 1.00
Growth Competitive Index Score 8 0.74 0.92 0.95 0.81 0.93 0.86 -1.00 1.00
Business Competitive Index Ranking 9 -0.71 -0.88 -0.93 -0.74 -0.89 -0.81 0.94 -0.94 1.00
Company operations and strategy ranking 10 -0.68 -0.80 -0.84 -0.65 -0.82 -0.73 0.87 -0.87 0.95 1.00
Quality of the national business environment ranking 11 -0.71 -0.89 -0.93 -0.75 -0.90 -0.82 0.95 -0.95 1.00 0.93 1.00
Growth Competitive Index Ranking (t-1) 12 -0.74 -0.93 -0.95 -0.83 -0.94 -0.87 0.98 -0.98 0.94 0.86 0.94 1.00
Real GDP per Capita 13 0.32 0.32 0.39 0.29 0.34 0.34 -0.40 0.40 -0.42 -0.44 -0.42 -0.38 1.00
Rating Standard and Poor's 14 0.76 0.91 0.93 0.81 0.92 0.87 -0.92 0.92 -0.89 -0.82 -0.90 -0.92 0.36 1.00
Rating Moody's 15 0.75 0.89 0.91 0.81 0.91 0.86 -0.92 0.92 -0.90 -0.83 -0.90 -0.91 0.38 0.98 1.00
(*) Source: Own calculations, based on World Bank (1 to 6, year 2004), World Economic Forum (7 to 12, year 2005), WEO (12, year 2004),  S&P (13, year 2004) and 
Moody's (14, year 2004). Based on a total of 98 countries.Unfortunately, even for these fairly simple ratios standard sources are not ideal. The 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics is not particularly homogeneous in its definition of debt 
across countries.
8 The World Bank’s Global Development Finance database has only external 
debt, by a residence criterion. The BIS has a comprehensive database on international securities 
and a separate one on banking. These sources have information on currency composition but are 
not comprehensive measures of debt as they miss domestic debt. The joint IMF, World Bank, 
BIS, OECD database attempts to combine various sources, but each with its own definitions,  
These issues are discussed in Inter-American Development Bank (2006) and Cowan et al. 
(2006). The associated database attempts to homogenize statistics across a group of countries 
including domestic and foreign debt. These data are focused on Latin America, although some 
comparator countries are also included. Moreover, for total (central) Government a still wider 
selection of countries is available. We use that measure of debt here to construct the variable tax 
revenues to total debt.  There is also a new database produced by IMF economists with much the 
same objective; see Jeanne and Guiscina (2006). This database has debt composition (foreign 
currency versus domestic currency) for a wider selection of systemic emerging countries. We 
also use this ratio to test if debt composition matters for ratings.  
Moreover, Calvo et al. (2004), Hausmann (2006) and Hausmann and Panizaa (2003) 
stress the currency composition of liabilities as a significant problem for developing countries.  
The first paper cited shows that countries with more severe balance sheet currency mismatches 
are more likely to suffer from a Sudden Stop in capital flows. We use two different measures of 
currency composition. First, we use debt issued in foreign currency divided by total debt. This is 
available in the Jeanne and Guiscina (2006) database for the widest number of countries. Second, 
we use the Hausmann and Panizza variable Original Sin 3 that captures the use of a country’s 
currency as an international unit of account. Original Sin 3 is calculated using the BIS securities’ 
database and is the total debt issued in the currency of the country divided by the external debt 
issued by that country. The idea is that this captures the ability of a country to issue debt in its 
own currency. 
Hausmann (2006) and García and Rigobón (2004) stress the interaction of currency 
composition and exchange rate dynamics in developing countries. This suggests that the 
                                                 
8 In particular, some countries report net debt, others gross.   14
volatility of the real exchange rate is also a relevant variable to determine the riskiness of 
emerging country sovereign debt. 
In the tables above we present a set of columns where we experiment by taking out the 
Current Account deficit and Government Effectiveness and including different specifications of 
the debt variables and the volatility of the real exchange. The second column of the tables simply 
replaces the time averages with fixed effects and includes time effects as well. As can be seen by 
the statistics of the regression, there is a slight improvement in the R-Squared for the time 
(within) variation, and the Hausmann statistic suggests that fixed effects are preferred.
9 While we 
understand the desire to provide a complete explanation of ratings, our interest in this paper is to 
explain the time variation, and we think that this is best achieved using regressions with fixed 
effects and, where necessary, time effects. 
The third column shows the results with fixed effects but takes out Government 
Effectiveness and the current account deficit. We also switch the debt ratio from debt to GDP to 
tax revenues to total debt, which we consider a better measure of the size of debt from a risk 
standpoint. As expected, the R-Squareds fall due to the exclusion of Government Effectiveness. 
This specification explains about 59 percent (Standard and Poor’s) and 41 percent (Moody’s) of 
the within variation.  
In column 4 we add the real exchange rate volatility and Original Sin 3 (OSIN3). 
However, the OSIN3 variable is not significant. There is some evidence, however, that higher 
real exchange rate volatility leads to a poorer rating. We also lose some observations and, 
probably due to this, the R-Squared falls slightly for Standard and Poor’s, though not for 
Moody’s. 
In column 5 we analyze whether global variables such as the US Treasury yield or the 
VIX or High Yield US corporate index affect credit ratings. Surprisingly, if anything we find that 
increases in US interest rates are associated with better credit ratings. The fall in spreads over the 
recent period certainly cannot be explained by changes in US interest rates. We also find no 
evidence that the High Yield or the VIX index affects ratings.  This suggests that there is no 
feedback from higher liquidity or lower risk aversion to better ratings. We will come back to this 
point below when we model spreads.  
                                                 
9 This test is 31.45 (probability measure of 0.0029) for Standard and Poor’s and 68.45 (probability measure 0.0000) 
for Moody’s, suggesting that fixed effects are preferred.   15
In column 6, we use the percentage of total debt issued in foreign currency from the 
Jeanne and Guiscina (2006) database. Unfortunately, this is only available for a limited number 
of countries ,but for this reduced sample we do indeed find that it is significant. This result 
reinforces the view that debt composition is an important variable and that initiatives to get better 
data on currency composition of debt are worthwhile exercises. Comparing the models for 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s reveals differences.  We return to consider these differences 
between the agencies in Section 4 below. 
 
Table 4. Actual and Fitted Ratings For Last Observation of the Sample, 
December  2006 
 
Country  Actual S&P  Fitted S&P  Actual Moody's  Fitted Moody's 
Argentina  B+  BB-  B3  B1 
Brazil  BB-  BB-  Ba3  B1 
Chile  A  AA-  Baa1  A2 
Colombia  BB  BB+  Ba2  Ba1 
Mexico  BBB  BBB-  Baa1  Baa3 
Peru  BB  BB  Ba3  Ba2 
Venezuela  B+  B+  B2  B1 
Source: S&P, Moody's and Own Calculations (our model, 2005) 
(*)Legend: Fitted 2 notches below = Green, 2 notches above=Red 
 
 
Table 4 compares the predicted values for our preferred models for both Standard and 
Poor’s and Moody’s versus the actual ratings for selected countries in Latin America for the last 
observations (December 2006). The model includes fixed effects and hence by definition the 
time averages of the predicted values are equal to the actual values. However, we note several 
differences in the actual and the fitted for the last observation. Here we comment on those cases 
where there is a difference of at least two notches between the actual and the fitted. Argentina 
appears to have too low a rating given its fundamentals in the case of Moody’s, Chile has too 
low a rating given its fundamentals for both agencies, and Mexico has a Moody’s rating higher 
than predicted by the model.
10 In terms of one-notch differences there is also some evidence that 
Colombia and Peru have higher predicted than actual ratings for at least one agency and Brazil 
has a rating one notch higher than predicted by the model in the case of Moody’s. 
                                                 
10 The model does not include a “NAFTA dummy.”   16
2.2 Factor Models of Ratings and of Economic Fundamentals 
 
In this section we present results conducting a factor analysis regarding ratings changes. It turns 
out that the changes in ratings of emerging economies can be represented by a small number of 
(global) factors. In Table 5 we present the results of the analysis. Just two factors can explain 
some 81 percent of the movement in ratings of all emerging economies, and three factors can 
explain almost 90 percent of the movement.  As we have established in the previous section that 
economic fundamentals appear to drive ratings rather than, say, global liquidity or risk aversion, 
we can be fairly confident that these global factors are real rather than financial in nature.  
Indeed, and perhaps more surprisingly, we also find that we can explain the changes in 
economic fundamentals, which explain a large proportion of ratings changes, by just a few 
(global) factors. In particular, two factors explain almost 56 percent of the variation in seven  
economic fundamentals across all emerging economies in the EMBI, and three factors explain 
almost 69 percent.  Finally we find that two factors explain 68 percent of the variation in the 
economic fundamentals and the ratings changes of Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s, and three 
factors explain almost 80 percent of the variation in these 9 series across the different emerging 
economies. These results suggest in particular that recent improvements in ratings, or underlying 
credit quality, are due in large part to a rather small number of global (real) factors. 
   17
 
 
Table 5. Principal Component Analysis 
of Credit Ratings and Economic Fundamentals 
 
Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
1 27.74 19.80 63.1% 63.1% 20.33 9.58 46.2% 46.2%
2 7.94 4.12 18.1% 81.1% 10.75 2.31 24.4% 70.6%
3 3.82 1.70 8.7% 89.8% 8.43 6.32 19.2% 89.8%
1 12.12 6.72 50.5% 50.5% 12.21 9.33 61.1% 61.1%
2 5.40 3.42 22.5% 73.0% 2.88 1.14 14.4% 75.5%
3 1.98 0.63 8.3% 81.3% 1.74 0.79 8.7% 84.2%
1 10.33 3.14 43.1% 43.1% 12.08 9.07 60.4% 60.4%
2 7.19 5.21 30.0% 73.0% 3.01 1.27 15.1% 75.5%
3 1.98 0.63 8.3% 81.3% 1.74 0.79 8.7% 84.2%
1 73.01 35.96 37.1% 37.1% 113.72 63.19 47.2% 47.2%
2 37.05 11.77 18.8% 55.9% 50.53 23.51 21.0% 68.2%
3 25.28 10.87 12.8% 68.7% 27.02 3.72 11.2% 79.4%
1 65.78 21.51 33.4% 33.4% 91.93 19.62 38.2% 38.2%
2 44.27 19.00 22.5% 55.9% 72.31 45.29 30.0% 68.2%
3 25.28 10.87 12.8% 68.7% 27.02 3.72 11.2% 79.4%
Moody's
Unrotated Components
Rotated Components (orthogonal varimax)
Source: Own calculations for EM economies, based on:  S&P, Moody's (Sovereign Credit Rating foreign currency 
long term)  ; Economic Fundamentals (*): WEO (Growth (%),  Inflation (%), Fiscal Balance (% of GDP), Tax 
revenues over Total Debt (%),  Reserves (% GDP), Exchange Rate Volatility (%)),  World Bank (Total Debt to 
exports (%)).
S&P Agency
Credit Ratings + Economic Fundamentals Economic Fundamentals (*)
Unrotated Components
Rotated Components (orthogonal varimax)
Credit Ratings
Both Agencies: S&P and Moody's










3. Models of Spreads 
 
In this section we discuss models for spreads. Our interest is twofold. First, we wish to see how 
much of the reduction in spreads can be accounted for by country fundamentals and how much 
by other, including financial, factors. In this regard it is often useful to use the rating as a 
convenient summary of information regarding credit quality. A second question we wish to 
consider is whether the ratings matter. This turns out to be a somewhat difficult question to 
answer if the question is posed correctly. 
First, we regress the spread on ratings and then on ratings and global financial variables, 
such as US Treasury yields, US High Yield spreads and the VIX index, as a test of whether the 
current level of spreads is justified by fundamentals or whether global factors are important.
11 
There is some discussion in the literature as to the appropriate way to do this, as once again the 
rating is not a cardinal variable. One way is simply to regress the spread or the log of the spread 
on dummies for each rating grade. In an appendix to this paper we present the results of such an 
analysis. However, a simpler method is to regress the log of the spread on the log of the rating. 
We find that this simplification does not change the main results. As our regressions include 
fixed effects we are again focusing on ratings changes rather than explaining the cross-sectional 
variation in spreads and ratings. 
                                                 
11 It is also tempting to include the general EMBI index. If included then the country in question should be excluded 
from the EMBI index – in other words in the panel for each country j it should be the general EMBI index excluding 
country j on the right hand side.  However, even then, if country i affects country j, there is an issue of endogeneity.  
We prefer not to include the EMBI as we wish to consider global factors that are exogenous to emerging markets in 
general. We believe that employing variables such as the US Treasury, US corporate High Yield and VIX indices 
yield a cleaner test of the hypotheses that we wish to consider.   19
Table 6. Explaining Spreads with Ratings 
 
Spread on Rating and Global Factors 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Credit Rating (logs)  -1.043  -2.169  -0.949  -1.784 
   (10.96)*** (5.19)*** (8.76)***  (11.22)*** 
Us Treasury 10 years (%)        0.420  0.391 
         (1.85)*  (1.64) 
Vix Index (%)        1.001  0.991 
         (8.94)***  (8.60)*** 
US High Yield (%)        0.029  0.018 
         (1.69)  (0.80) 
Constant  8.038  10.635  3.928  6.047 
   (37.84)*** (11.19)*** (7.39)***  (12.91)*** 
Observations  2703  2646  2703  2646 
Number of group(wbcode)  30  29  30  29 
Rating from  S&P  Moody's  S&P  Moody's 
Rsq-Overall  0.53  0.56  0.67  0.73 
Rsq-Within  0.31  0.30  0.70  0.65 
Rsq-Between  0.74  0.71  0.74  0.78 
Robust t statistics in parentheses             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
 
The results indicate that ratings are indeed highly significant for explaining spreads.
12 
However, we cannot fully explain the movement in spreads with ratings alone;if financial 
variables such as the VIX, the US high yield and a US interest rate are added they are significant 
in explaining spreads.
13 Of particular interest is the in sample prediction of the model with and 
without the financial variables added. Figures 2a and 2b illustrates these for the cases of 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. It is clear that without the financial variables current 
spreads are not well-predicted and indeed, even with financial variables added, current spreads 
still appear low. 
 
 
                                                 
12 As discussed above, we leave for future research a dynamic version. Assuming both series are I(1) the above 
might be interpreted as the long run or cointegrating vector; see González Rozada and Levy-Yeyati (2006) for an 
analysis of  the relation between spreads along these lines. 
13 This also holds for the model in the appendix with ratings dummies and hence is not a result of the log (ratings) 
variable being employed. We also tried including an interaction term between the ratings and the VIX index to test if 
the coefficient on the VIX varied with the rating. The interaction term was not significant, although we note that the 
model (being in logs) is already non-linear.   20
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Moody's + Global Factors  21
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S&P + Global Factors
Moody's + Global Factors  22
Indeed, if we exclude the financial variables, the average error of the model in the last 
observation is between 153 (Standard and Poor’s) and 176 (Moody’s) basis points across all 
emerging economies. Including the financial variables the average error of the model across 
countries is some 22 (Standard and Poor’s) or 41 (Moody’s) basis points in the last observation.
14 
More generally, if considering a variance decomposition we find that the global financial 
variables explain almost 20 percent of the variation in spreads, although spreads explain 40 
percent (Moody’s) and almost 60 percent (S and P).  This is illustrated in Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3. Variance Decomposition of Country EMBI Spreads 
 
It is not clear which of the three financial variables (US Treasury, US High Yield or VIX index) 
should be included in the regression above, nor is it clear what these variables actually represent. 
Alternatives include a) the time value of money, b) liquidity, c) risk aversion, or d) some 
combination of these concepts. 
 
 
                                                 
14 We stress that these regressions have individual fixed effects and hence, by definition, the time average of the 
predicted spread is equal to the actual spread across the whole sample. Again, these results are not particularly 










Rating Global Financial Factors fixed effect
S&P Moody's  23














Hence, we also conduct a factor analysis of these three financial variables and find that two 
factors explain a very high proportion of the three. In Figure 4, we graph the loadings of these 
two factors. The figure suggests that Factor 1 is more akin to risk, as it captures the variation in 
the VIX and the US corporate High Yield spread, whereas Factor 2 appears to be more related to 
liquidity or the time value of money, as it appears to capture the US 10 year bond yield. We 
place these two factors in the regression. The results are displayed in Table 7, and what appears 
to matter for emerging economy spreads is the factor most associated with risk, the US high 
yield and the VIX index, and the least associated with the US treasury yield. 
   24
Table 7. Explaining Spreads with Ratings and Financial Factors 
 
   (1)  (2) 
Credit Rating (logs)  -0.938  -1.716 
   (8.91)***  (10.57)*** 
        
Financial Vars Factor 1  0.280  0.265 
   (15.59)***  (12.70)*** 
        
Financial Vars Factor  2  0.033  0.025 
   (1.09)  (0.81) 
        
Constant  7.797  9.598 
   (33.20)***  (25.94)*** 
Rating Agency  S&P  Moody's 
Observations  2476  2442 
Number of group(wbcode)  30  29 
Rsq-Overall  0.68  0.73 
Rsq-Within  0.72  0.64 
Rsq-Between  0.74  0.79 
Robust t statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All regressions include fixed effects    
 
 
4. Do Opinions Matter? 
 
In the previous section we regressed spreads on ratings using ratings as a convenient summary of 
fundamentals. However, this does not answer the question, do ratings matter? The question that 
we pose here is, controlling for fundamentals, do ratings affect spreads? This question is, 
however, somewhat problematic to test, precisely because ratings to a large extent summarize 
fundamentals.  
One technique is to regress ratings on fundamentals and then regress spreads on 
fundamentals but also include the residuals from the first regression. This was the technique 
employed in Eichengreen and Mody (1998). The residual of the regression of ratings might be 
interpreted as the opinion of the agency over and above the credit quality explained by the 
economic fundamentals. We conduct such an analysis and display the results in Table 8 below.  
We find that the residual is highly significant, suggesting that the opinions of rating agencies are 
important controlling for fundamentals. However, such a regression can be criticized. If the error 
term of the first regression is an opinion of the agency in question, then how can it can conform   25
to the appropriate statistical properties of an error to ensure that the regression is valid? In a 
sense it is simply a leap of faith to claim that the error here is the opinion of the agency plus the 
actual error of the regression, and we have no way of really telling which is which. 
A second methodology is to estimate a system of equations with the rating and the spread 
as the two endogenous variables. We employ annual data and use the end of period spread. 
Given most economic variables are known before the end of the year—or at least there are 
generally reasonable forecasts thereof—we suggest that ratings affect spreads but do not allow 
that spreads affect ratings. We also exploit the fact that the global financial variables affect 
spreads but not ratings. Even with all the economic fundamentals included in the spreads 
regression, we find that ratings affect spreads. We then proceed to eliminate economic 
fundamentals from the spreads regression that do not appear as significant or have the wrong 
sign. We conclude with the regression again presented in Table 8.  
Our main findings are that a) ratings appear to matter for spreads over and above 
fundamentals; b) that growth affects spreads over and above ratings; c) that the fiscal balance 
affects spreads over and above Moody’s ratings (or perhaps Moody’s weights the fiscal balance 
as less important than “the market”); and d) that EU membership appears to affect spreads over 
and above Standard and Poor’s ratings (or perhaps that Standard and Poor’s weights EU 
membership as less important than “the market”).  
However, once again such an analysis has its limitations. On the one hand we have 
imposed the restriction that the effect of spreads on ratings is zero, yet on the other hand we have 
eliminated fundamentals from the spreads regression in a somewhat ad hoc fashion. 
   26




Rating Spread Rating Spread Rating Spread Rating Spread
Rating Agency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Credit Residual/Credit rating -0.170 -0.135 -0.257 -0.358
(5.16)*** (5.16)*** (12.14)*** (11.58)***
Growth (%) 4.997 4.254 -0.347 -4.241 -3.381 -4.488 -2.594
(3.97)*** (2.67)** (1.90)* (2.35)** (3.99)*** (2.20)** (2.80)***
GDP PC (%) -0.387 -2.118 -1.136 -2.069 9.250 8.730
(0.12) (2.71)*** (0.31) (2.36)** (7.77)*** (7.07)***
Unemployment (%) -0.040 -0.005 -0.072 -0.009 0.055 0.003
(0.90) (0.44) (1.44) (0.74) (1.66)* (0.10)
Inflation (%) -0.083 0.027 -0.012 0.009 -0.031 -0.004 0.038 0.008
(4.29)*** (2.99)*** (0.61) (0.57) (0.74) (0.23) (1.01) (0.52)
Fiscal Balance over GDP (%) 6.630 -2.267 0.358 -2.263 2.877 -1.040 -2.284 -3.274
(1.85)* (1.84)* (0.09) (1.80)* (1.13) (0.98) (0.80) (2.80)***
Foreign Debt to Exports (%) -0.175 0.462 -0.350 0.457 0.060 -0.440
(0.45) (6.39)*** (0.82) (5.71)*** (0.33) (2.50)**
Tax Revenue to Total Debt (%) 0.622 -0.162 0.636 -0.187 0.588 -0.077
(2.60)** (1.88)* (2.77)*** (2.60)*** (3.00)*** (0.42)
Reserves to GDP (%) -2.353 -4.321 -0.671 -4.322 3.178 3.882
(0.82) (7.75)*** (0.24) (6.98)*** (1.98)** (2.54)**
Original Sin 3 (%) -0.809 0.392 -0.396 0.300 0.336 0.607
(1.22) (1.70)* (0.60) (1.26) (0.53) (1.00)
Volatility of Real Exchange Rate (%) -0.076 0.019 -0.089 0.017 -0.039 -0.033
(2.30)** (2.78)*** (3.26)*** (2.13)** (2.49)** (2.19)**
In Default (0,1) -5.877 1.173 -2.101 1.174 -6.230 -3.181
(11.28)*** (6.36)*** (2.88)*** (4.78)*** (13.70)*** (7.30)***
EU Enter Dummy (0,1) 0.906 -1.470 2.267 -1.376 -0.163 -0.442 1.125 -0.121
(3.19)*** (5.41)*** (7.13)*** (4.98)*** (0.25) (1.67)* (1.53) (0.39)
EU Step Dummy (0,1) 0.670 -1.147 1.468 -0.949 -0.687 0.305
(1.65) (5.03)*** (3.77)*** (4.27)*** (1.37) (0.64)
Vix Index (%) 0.126 0.206 0.229 0.035
(0.90) (1.39) (1.87)* (0.29)
US High Yield (10 y %) 0.898 0.801 0.962 1.017
(5.08)*** (4.61)*** (5.25)*** (5.72)***
US Treasury (10 y %) 0.071 0.119 0.245 -0.051
(0.36) (0.61) (1.42) (0.30)
Constant 7.204 5.458 7.737 5.948 -11.786 5.480 -9.129 7.000
(3.89)*** (17.15)*** (3.63)*** (16.82)*** (4.30)*** (13.67)*** (3.29)*** (15.60)***
Type of Regression
Observations 368 212 367 213 203 203 204 204
Number of group(wbcode) 38 26 40 26
Rsq-Overall 0.29 0.65 0.30 0.65 0.9307 0.7886 0.9095 0.7597
Rsq-Within 0.53 0.68 0.41 0.67
Rsq-Between 0.36 0.61 0.41 0.59
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Moody's
Employing Residuals of Rating Regression Estimating a System
Moody's S&P Moody's S&P
S&P Moody's S&P  27
An alternative would be to conduct an event study where daily spreads are observed 
around ratings’ changes. A potential problem with this latter methodology is that fundamentals 
are changing and hence it is not obvious whether any change in spread accompanied by a rating 
change is due to the change in rating or a change in the fundamentals. Moreover, while event 
studies in corporate finance normally focus on events that are arguably shocks (e.g., the 
announcement of a merger or stock split), rating agencies do their best to make rating changes 
predictable, announcing an outlook, a credit watch and even a list of credit drivers that are 
suggestive of when a rating change would come.
15 These actions by the agencies make the 
methodology of the event study problematic. 
However, as noted above the rating agencies do not always agree! Considering the 
available rating history for Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s, they disagree about as much as 
they agree in the sense that roughly 50 percent of the observations regarding emerging 
economies suggest disagreement. Figure 5 illustrates these disagreements by country and over 
time. Each bar in the figure represents a disagreement, with those in the positive terrain 
indicating a better rating by Standard and Poor’s and the negative bars indicating that Moody’s 
gives a better rating. 
 
                                                 
15 For example, it might be announced that a constraint to an upgrade for Peru is tax administration and hence its 
overall tax revenue as a percentage of GDP or debt. Thus, if Peru’s tax administration improves the market will start 






























































































































































































































































Standard and Poor's Higher Rating
Moody's Higher Rating


















In order to investigate these disagreements further we conducted a regression of rating 
differences on the economic fundamentals that we found to be important in explaining ratings 
above. As we have many zero observations in the dependent variable we did this employing an 
ordered Probit and an ordered Logit. The results are highly consistent across the two 
methodologies and are reported in Table 9.    29
 
Table 9. Explaining Rating Differences 
Dependent Variable is Moody Rating Minus S&P Rating 
 
 
We find many significant differences. For example higher fiscal surplus, higher tax 
revenue and higher reserves and lower inflation all imply higher Standard and Poor’s ratings 
relative to Moody’s. On the other hand, higher debt to exports implies a lower Moody’s rating 
relative to Standard and Poor’s. While the same variables may be relevant for the ratings of each 
agency, it appears that there are significant differences in how the agencies weight these different 
fundamentals. 
These differences allow us to develop a new methodology to consider if these opinions 
matter. In the following regressions we regress spreads on the ratings of one agency (say 
Standard and Poor’s) and a dummy which takes the value of one if the other agency (say 
Moody’s) upgrades the country by one notch  and the other agency does not. The dummy takes a 
value of 2 if the upgrade is two notches or –1 if there is a one-notch downgrade, etc. We conduct 
these regressions for both agencies. These regressions are then a test of whether an upgrade (or 
downgrade) by one agency matters if the other agency does not upgrade (downgrade). As we 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Growth (%) 3.039 3.223 5.649 8.212
(1.61) (0.99) (2.39)** (2.04)**
Unemployment (%) 0.005 -0.003 0.015 0.016
(0.38) (0.13) (0.99) (0.50)
Inflation (%) 0.072 0.114 0.048 0.074
(3.08)*** (4.28)*** (2.31)** (3.05)***
Fiscal Balance over GDP (%) -7.164 -13.676 -8.252 -15.847
(3.66)*** (4.00)*** (3.27)*** (3.86)***
Debt to Exports (% GDF) -0.198 -0.417 -0.206 -0.434
(2.80)*** (3.48)*** (2.45)** (3.00)***
Tax Revenue to Total Debt (%) -0.112 -0.177 -0.156 -0.261
(2.77)*** (2.45)** (2.15)** (1.70)*
Reserves to GDP (%) -2.102 -3.838 -2.470 -4.511
(4.12)*** (4.30)*** (3.60)*** (3.96)***
Original Sin 3 (%) -0.445 -0.957 -0.506 -1.043
(1.23) (1.29) (1.24) (1.11)
Volatility of Real Exchange Rate (%) 0.020 0.021 0.035 0.049
(1.24) (0.68) (2.10)** (1.68)*
Regression type Ordered Probit Ordered Logit Ordered Probit Ordered Logit
Consider agreements Yes Yes No No
Observations 375 375 225 225
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  30
also include fixed effects, it is then a type of difference-in-difference regression. The results are 
detailed in Table 10. 
 
Table 10. Opinions Matter 
   (1)  (2) 
Credit Rating Agency 1 (logs)  -1.084  -1.656 
   (11.25)***  (8.40)*** 
Upgrade/Downgrade Other Agency  -0.064  -0.180 
   (1.84)*  (4.49)*** 
Us Treasury 10 years (%)  0.368  0.524 
   (1.68)  (2.54)** 
Vix Index (%)  0.975  0.948 
   (8.60)***  (9.14)*** 
US High Yield (%)  0.031  0.024 
   (1.69)  (1.23) 
Constant  4.368  5.580 
   (9.74)***  (9.77)*** 
Rating Agency 1  S&P  Moody's 
Observations  2646  2646 
Number of group(wbcode)  29  29 
Rsq-Overall  0.72  0.75 
Rsq-Within  0.71  0.72 
Rsq-Between  0.81  0.79 
Robust t statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Regressions include fixed effects       
 
 
As shown in the table, we find that in both cases (taking either Standard and Poor’s or Moody’s 
as the base rating agency), the changes in the second agency matter even when there is no change 
in the first agency rating. This lends further support to the notion that ratings do matter. 
 
5. Recent Impact of World Financial Variables on EM Asset Prices 
 
An interesting question is whether the importance of global financial conditions has been stable 
or whether there is evidence of an increase or a decrease in the dependency of emerging country 
spreads on world financial markets. This may be considered a test of whether, as markets have 
globalized, emerging country assets are now influenced more or less by global financial 
conditions relative to economic fundamentals as indicated by ratings. One view, for example, 
might be that as markets have become more integrated, information improves and hence markets   31
may become more discriminatory. The opposite view however is that with integration comes 
greater diversification of individual investors and hence less incentive to become well-informed 
regarding particular investment opportunities. This latter view might suggest that world financial 
factors should become more important as markets integrate.
16 
We ran a moving panel regression of the log spread on the log rating and on the VIX. We 
used windows of 41 months with the last window being from January 2004 to June 2007 and the 
first from September 2000 to January 2004. Figure 6 plots the coefficient on the VIX for each of 
these regressions plus and minus two standard errors. Interestingly, at first there is a tendency for 
the coefficient to increase, although overall there appears to be some evidence that global 
financial conditions are now less important than before in explaining emerging asset returns. At 
the same time, however, it is not clear if this change is statistically significant. 
 
 
Figure 6. Have Global Financial Conditions Increased in Importance for Emerging 
Country Asset Pricing? 
 
 
                                                 
16 See Calvo and Mendoza (2000) for an interesting account and theories of how information affects the dependence 

































In order to conduct a formal test we ran a regression as above for the whole period but 
introduced a dummy variable that is zero and then 1 after December 2000.  We then interacted 
this dummy with our variables of interest (VIX and High Yield). The significance of the 
coefficient on this interaction between the dummy and the variable of interest is then a test of the 
stability of the coefficient on the relevant variable between the first half and the second half of 
our sample. We then tried different specifications using the ratings of each rating agency, 
Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s, and with the VIX and the High Yield and the US interest rate 
(the llatter was not significant). All specifications include fixed effects. The results are presented 
in Table 12. 
 
 
Table 12. Test of Parameter Stability: Changing Dependence of Sovereign Spreads 
on World Financial Factors 
 
 
Dependent Variable is EMBI Spread for Panel of Countries
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
log_sprating -0.980 -0.972 -0.999 -1.795 -1.791 -1.813




(0 if year <2001) 0.354 0.169
(1.90)* (0.76)
log_vix 1.346 1.180 1.211 1.129
(12.03)*** (16.15)*** (11.19)*** (14.17)***
dummy*vix 
(0 if year <2001) -0.244 -0.067 -0.155 -0.066




(0 if year <2001) -0.132 -0.127
(4.37)*** (3.71)***
Constant 4.238 4.517 4.014 6.520 6.562 6.159
(10.74)*** (11.32)*** (9.78)*** (13.27)*** (13.17)*** (11.25)***
Rating Agency S&P S&P S&P Moody's Moody's Moody's
Observations 2877 2877 2877 2814 2814 2814
Number of group(wbcode) 30 30 30 29 29 29
Rsq-Overall 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.73 0.73 0.71
Rsq-Within 0.71 0.71 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.61
Rsq-Between 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.80 0.80 0.79
Robust t statistics in parentheses, all regressions have fixed effects
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  33
In virtually all cases the coefficient on the interaction term between the dummy and the 
coefficient of interest (High Yield or VIX) is negative and is statistically significant. In only one 
specification is this not the case, but in that specification the US interest rate is included and is 
not significant. This suggests that there is some evidence that global financial factors were less 
important in the second part of the sample relative to the first part of the sample.
17  T h e  
conclusion is that as markets have become more integrated there is, if anything, less dependence 
on world financial factors.  
To investigate in more detail the impact of global factors on emerging economy asset 
prices during the current market turmoil, we chose to also consider daily data on five-year Credit 
Default Swap (CDS) spreads.
18 This variable is arguably a cleaner measure of perceived default 
risk than the EMBI, which for an individual country is constructed as the spread of a super-bond 
made up of the payment structures of a series of individual bonds of different maturities and 
durations. The series for CDS spreads are not, however, available for the time periods nor for the 
same range of countries as the sovereign spreads used for the other analyses in this paper. We 
used the VIX and the High Yield indices as a global financial factor and indicator of global 
risk.
19 We regressed the CDS spread of a set of 20 emerging countries on the VIX index and 
fixed effects using daily data for a period of 458 working days—roughly the last two years 
ending August 2007—giving some 9,158 observations. The results are reported in Table 13 
below indicate that the both the VIX or the High Yield are significant for determining the 
movements in CDS spreads.  
To investigate further the transmission of shocks to global risk or risk aversion to 
emerging economy asset prices, we researched independent assessments of the most important 
news items emanating from the sub-prime crisis. There are various “timelines” published but the 
most suitable for our purposes appeared to be one from the BBC (included in the Appendix).
20 
                                                 
17 Note that the first part of the sample does not include the Russian default but starts after that in September 2000. 
18 For primers on sovereign CDS’s see BIS Quarterly Review 2003 Dec, “Sovereign Credit Default Swaps” that 
indicates substantial volumes at 5 year maturities available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0312g.pdf and also 
see “Credit Derivatives in Emerging Economies,” by Roman Ranciere, IMF Policy Discussion Paper, 2001 (Sep) 
available at www.imf.org 
19 The analysis could be done equally with the index of US high-yield bond spreads or the principal component that 
appears to summarize these two as suggested above. 
20 We did take out of the BBC timeline included the appendix and in the definition of the dummy, events that 
appeared to be particularly European in nature to focus attention on the US sub-prime crisis. The timeline reported 
also includes the Fed and ECB events. These are included in the Fed and ECB dummies and not in the sub-prime 
News Dummy.   34
This timeline appeared superior, as events were identified with more precision than other 
published timelines and the period of analysis covered was also more comprehensive. We used 
this timeline to create a dummy variable which we call News Dummy, and we interacted this 
with the VIX and High Yield indices.
21 Our interpretation of the coefficient on this interaction 
term is then the additional effect of changes in the VIX/High Yield on CDS spreads as a result of 
news regarding the sub-prime crisis. If the coefficient on the interaction term is positive, then 
news regarding the sub-prime crisis had a greater impact on emerging economy asset prices than 
other news that caused the VIX /High Yield to move while if the coefficient is negative, the 
opposite would be indicated.  
 
Table 13. Explaining Credit Default Swap Spreads with 
Measures of Global Risk and Sub-Prime News 
 
  
The timeline also includes events where the Fed lowered  the discount rate by 25 basis 
points and altered lending conditions to banks and the subsequently lowered the policy rate by 50 
basis points. The timeline also includes the changes in ECB policy to inject liquidity into the 
European market. These events are summarized by a Fed dummy and an ECB dummy 
                                                 
21 In future work, we plan to test the robustness of the results with alternative timelines or adjustments to the BBC 
timeline. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VIX 2.568 3.034
(28.74)*** (28.23)***
Interaction VIX * News Dummy -0.588***
(6.90)
High Yield 42.0 43.0
(53.7)*** (53.33)***
Interaction HY*News Dummy -0.758***
(4.57)
Fed Dummy -15.8*** -8.28***
(3.60) (3.08)
ECB Dummy -18.6*** -10.3***
(2.72) (6.07)
Within R-Squared 0.019 0.098 0.260 0.262
Adj R-Squared 0.856 0.857 0.857 0.883
Nr Observations 8246 8246 8246 8246
All regressions include fixed effects
t-statistics are in parenthesis  35
respectively.  The results of introducing these additional variables into the regression is also 
illustrated in Table 13. As can be seen, the changes in policies of the Fed and the ECB served to 
reduce emerging economy CDS spreads, as would be expected. The sub-prime News Dummy 
interacted with the VIX or interacted with the High Yield has a negative coefficient. 
This means that on those days where there was an event related to the sub-prime crisis, 
the movement in the VIX actually had less effect on CDS spreads than on an average day. This 
result suggests first of all that all types of movements in the VIX are not equal in terms of their 
effects on emerging markets.  Second, it suggests that over the period analyzed the sub-prime 
crisis was perhaps viewed as a US crisis and not one that would affect emerging economies more 
than other events that caused the VIX to move over this period—presumably changes in global 
risk or risk aversion not related to sub prime events.  To summarize the results suggest that sub-
prime events per se had a relatively subdued effect on emerging economy asset prices over the 




In this paper we have investigated a number of issues related to emerging economy sovereign 
ratings and spreads. First, we find that a small number of economic fundamentals explains the 
ratings of the two leading rating agencies reasonably well. We find some evidence for the 
inclusion of debt currency composition although data limitations remain binding to enhance this 
analysis. We find that global financial variables do not help to explain ratings such that rating 
agencies decisions appear to be independent of changes in world financial conditions. However, 
we find that a very few global factors explain a large proportion of the variation in ratings and of 
the economic fundamentals that we find determine ratings. Our conclusion is that ratings’ 
improvements have been driven by improvements in fundamentals, which in turn have been 
largely driven by a small set of global factors.  
We also present models of spreads and investigate whether the reductions in spreads to 
the end of 2006 can be explained by the improvement in fundamentals. The answer is that it does 
so, but only partially. Spreads fell further than would be predicted from the improvement in 
ratings. However, we can explain spread reductions to the end of 2006 using both ratings and 
world financial factors. The overall result is that spreads were some 150 to 170 basis points 
lower than those predicted by the improvement in ratings alone.   36
We also consider whether, controlling for fundamentals, there is evidence that ratings 
matter. We find using methodologies previously employed in the literature that that they do. 
Moreover, we note that rating agencies do not always agree. In fact they disagree about 50 
percent of the time, and we find that while in general the same economic variables tend to 
explain ratings, different agencies appear to weigh these factors differently. We then exploit 
these differences to test again, using a type of difference in difference technique, whether these 
opinions matter. The results suggest that indeed they do. 
Finally, we investigate how the dependence of emerging economy asset prices to world 
financial conditions may have changed over time and how emerging asset prices have been 
affected by news on the sub-prime crisis. We find evidence that global financial factors have 
decreased in importance as a determinant of emerging economy spreads. One interpretation is 
that as markets have become more integrated, information has improved and markets have 
become more discriminating.
22  We also find that in the last two years, the sub-prime crisis does 
not appear to be the main channel whereby movements in the VIX affect emerging asset prices. 
Movements in the VIX emanating from sub-prime events had less effect on emerging economy 





                                                 
22 A second view, however, is that the second sub-period was one of abundant global liquidity, and in these 
conditions world financial factors may be less important for emerging economy asset prices.   37
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Appendix: Explaining Spreads with Ratings: A Non-Linear General Model 
 
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
Credit Rating=1  Dummy (0,1) -0.359 2.936 -0.357 2.322
(1.20) (6.66)*** (1.18) (5.31)***
Credit Rating=2  Dummy (0,1) -0.725 3.364 2.580 0.901 -0.723 0.903 1.963 0.900
(3.99)*** (12.99)*** (8.05)*** (60.53)*** (4.00)*** (57.02)*** (6.37)*** (58.72)***
Credit Rating=4  Dummy (0,1) -0.901 3.226 2.350 0.842 -0.898 0.769 1.729 0.843
(4.81)*** (5.34)*** (6.58)*** (2.47)** (4.64)*** (2.05)* (4.92)*** (2.47)**
Credit Rating=5  Dummy (0,1) -1.359 3.198 1.911 0.820 -1.367 0.735 1.289 0.817
(10.09)*** (5.54)*** (6.29)*** (2.50)** (10.22)*** (2.04)* (4.39)*** (2.49)**
Credit Rating=6  Dummy (0,1) -1.449 1.792 1.795 -0.654 -1.454 -0.668 1.178 -0.656
(9.54)*** (10.25)*** (5.78)*** (3.04)*** (9.69)*** (3.23)*** (3.97)*** (3.04)***
Credit Rating=7  Dummy (0,1) -1.802 2.125 1.477 -0.303 -1.802 -0.336 0.863 -0.305
(13.77)*** (9.94)*** (4.79)*** (1.79)* (14.10)*** (2.34)** (3.02)*** (1.80)*
Credit Rating=8  Dummy (0,1) -1.885 1.454 1.363 -0.995 -1.885 -1.003 0.751 -0.995
(15.59)*** (6.75)*** (4.52)*** (5.40)*** (15.85)*** (5.70)*** (2.69)** (5.41)***
Credit Rating=9  Dummy (0,1) -2.191 1.144 1.050 -1.281 -2.187 -1.328 0.444 -1.289
(18.84)*** (5.86)*** (3.57)*** (10.68)*** (19.19)*** (11.50)*** (1.62) (10.66)***
Credit Rating=10  Dummy (0,1) -2.353 1.186 0.938 -1.279 -2.321 -1.256 0.358 -1.275
(25.84)*** (7.94)*** (3.33)*** (5.98)*** (25.42)*** (5.72)*** (1.37) (5.99)***
Credit Rating=11  Dummy (0,1) -2.640 1.025 0.653 -1.503 -2.616 -1.404 0.080 -1.490
(21.80)*** (4.92)*** (2.04)* (8.22)*** (22.47)*** (6.91)*** (0.28) (7.96)***
Credit Rating=12  Dummy (0,1) -2.688 0.723 0.586 -1.700 0.559 0.732 0.574 -1.757
(22.67)*** (5.66)*** (2.29)** (8.98)*** (2.48)** (5.61)*** (2.24)** (9.47)***
Credit Rating=13  Dummy (0,1) -3.019 0.437 0.321 -1.972 0.261 0.453 0.352 -2.027
(24.32)*** (4.02)*** (1.17) (9.37)*** (1.01) (4.14)*** (1.27) (9.81)***
Credit Rating=14  Dummy (0,1) -3.028 0.407 0.273 -1.998 0.236 0.410 0.285 -2.058
(21.30)*** (4.22)*** (1.21) (8.95)*** (1.14) (4.24)*** (1.25) (8.87)***
Credit Rating=15  Dummy (0,1) -3.266 0.061 0.040 -2.397 -0.005 0.066 0.051 -2.457
(13.09)*** (0.80) (0.40) (8.87)*** (0.04) (0.85) (0.48) (8.80)***
Credit Rating=16  Dummy (0,1) -3.257 0.112 -2.373 0.113 -2.435
(11.83)*** (0.96) (8.07)*** (0.96) (7.95)***
Credit Rating=17  Dummy (0,1) -2.435 -2.497
(9.02)*** (8.79)***
Us Treasury 10 years (%) 0.449 0.329 0.402 0.327
(2.16)** (1.73)* (1.86)* (1.71)*
Vix Index (%) 0.927 0.910 0.895 0.906
(9.52)*** (8.10)*** (8.98)*** (8.11)***
US High Yield (%) 0.028 0.030 0.031 0.029
(1.75)* (1.66) (1.92)* (1.60)
Scores for component 1 0.262 0.262 0.258 0.261
(13.33)*** (11.92)*** (13.68)*** (11.60)***
Scores for component 2 0.039 0.020 0.033 0.020
(1.38) (0.84) (1.14) (0.84)
Investment grade Dummy (0,1) -2.902 0.454
(9.48)*** (3.29)***
Investment grade  step Dummy (0,1) -0.437 -0.610 -0.716 0.087
(2.10)** (3.67)*** (5.37)*** (0.74)
Constant 4.350 1.025 4.778 6.965 4.399 1.126 5.252 6.979
(9.71)*** (3.04)*** (18.76)*** (47.27)*** (9.75)*** (3.35)*** (21.95)*** (47.80)***
Rating Agency S&P Moody's S&P Moody's S&P Moody's S&P Moody's
Observations 2703 2646 2476 2442 2703 2646 2476 2442
Number of group(wbcode) 30 29 30 29 30 29 30 29
Rsq-Overall 0.78 0.73 0.78 0.73 0.73 0.66 0.65 0.73
Rsq-Within 0.75 0.72 0.75 0.73 0.75 0.73 0.76 0.73
Rsq-Between 0.80 0.70 0.81 0.71 0.74 0.60 0.60 0.71
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All regressions include fixed effects  40
Appendix : Sub-Prime Timeline (BBC) 
Explanation for the motivation of the timeline from BBC website: “Global markets have 
been shaken up by fears of a credit crunch. Billions of dollars have been wiped off share 
prices, while the credit markets have been going through a period of re-pricing that 
prompted fears of a meltdown. But what triggered all the problems, and what were the 




12 March 2007 
Shares in New Century Financial, one of the biggest sub-prime lenders in the US, are suspended 
amid fears it may be heading for bankruptcy. 
16 March 
US-based sub-prime firm Accredited Home Lenders Holding says it will pass on $2.7bn of 
money loaned - at a heavy discount - in order to generate some cash for its business. 
2 April 
New Century Financial files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection after it was forced by its 
backers to repurchase billions of dollars worth of bad loans. 
The company says it will have to cut 3,200 jobs, more than half of its workforce, as a result of 
the move. 
24 May 
Shares in Bear Stearns come under pressure as questions are raised about the investment bank's 
exposure to the sub-prime market in the US. 
14 June 
Reports emerge that Bear Stearns is liquidating its assets in a hedge fund that made large bets on 
the US sub-prime market. 
20 June 
Merrill Lynch seizes and sells $800m (£400m) of bonds that are being used as collateral for 
loans made to Bear Stearns’ hedge funds. 
22 June 
Bear Stearns says it will provide $3.2bn in loans to bail out one of its hedge funds, the High-
Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund. 
The bailout of the fund would be the largest by a bank in almost a decade. 
Analysts have also been questioning the position of another fund, the High-Grade Structured 
Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund. 
25 June 
Reports emerge that Bear Stearns will have to rescue a second hedge fund as rival banks refuse 
to help in bailing it out. 
29 June 
Bear Stearns hires a new head of asset management to find out what went wrong at its hedge 
funds. 
13 July 
US industrial firm General Electric decides to sell the WMC Mortgage sub-prime lending 
business that it bought in 2004. 
“The mortgage industry has greatly changed since the purchase of WMC,” says its chief Laurent 
Bossard.   41
18 July 
Bear Stearns tells investors that they will get little, if any, money back from the two hedge funds 
that the lender has had to rescue. 
20 July 
Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke warns that the crisis in the US sub-prime lending 
market could cost up to $100bn. 
26 July 
Bear Stearns seizes assets from one of its problem-hit hedge funds as it tries to stem losses. 
27 July 
Worries about the sub-prime crisis hammer global stock markets and the main US Dow Jones 
stock index loses 4.2% in five sessions, its worst weekly decline in almost five years. 
31 July 
Bear Stearns stops clients from withdrawing cash from a third fund, saying it has been 
overwhelmed by redemption requests. 
The lender also files for bankruptcy protection for the two funds it had to bail out earlier. 
3 August 
US stock markets fall heavily, with the main Dow Jones Index ending the session 2.1% lower, 
amid fears about how many financial firms are exposed to problems in the sub-prime market. 
A top Bear Stearns executive says credit markets are in the worst turmoil he has seen in 22 years. 
London's main FTSE 100 stock index closes down 1.2% at 6,224.3, with French and German 
markets also declining. 
5 August 
Bear Stearns co-president Warren Spector steps down, as the lender looks to restore investor 
confidence following the problems with its sub-prime exposure. 
6 August 
American Home Mortgage, one of the largest US independent home loan providers, files for 
bankruptcy after laying off the majority of its staff. 
The company says it is a victim of the slump in the US housing market that has caught out many 
sub-prime borrowers and lenders. 
9 August 
French bank BNP Paribas suspends three investment funds worth 2bn euros (£1.4bn), citing 
problems in the US sub-prime mortgage sector. 
BNP says that it cannot value the assets in the fund, because the market has disappeared. 
Dutch bank NIBC announces losses of 137m euros from asset-backed securities in the first half 
of this year. 
The European Central Bank (ECB) pumps 95bn euros into the eurozone banking market to allay 
fears about a sub-prime credit crunch. 
The US Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan take similar steps. 
10 August 
Global stock markets stay under intense pressure. 
London’s FTSE 100 index has its worst day in more than four years, closing 3.7% lower. 
The ECB provides an extra 61bn euros of funds for banks. 
The US Fed says it will provide as much money as is needed to combat the credit crunch. 
13 August 
Wall Street giant Goldman Sachs says it will pump $2bn into one of its funds to help shore up its 
value.   42
The ECB pumps 47.7bn euros into the money markets, its third cash injection in as many 
14 August 
Stock markets remain jittery as news continues to come out about the exposure of banks to the 
fallout from the sub-prime market. 
Swiss bank UBS warns that the market turmoil is likely to hit its earnings in the July to 
September period. 
Australian mortgage lender Rams Home says the “unprecedented disruptions” in credit markets 
may reduce its profit. 
17 August 
The US Federal Reserve cuts the interest rate at which it lends to banks by a quarter of a 
percentage point to help banks deal with credit problems. 
26 August 
The German regional bank SachsenLB is rapidly sold to Germany’s biggest regional bank, 
Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg. 
It came close to collapsing under its exposure to sub-prime debt. 